


ORIGINAL

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS  
DALLAS DIVISION



JOSE LUIS RUIZ,  
Petitioner,  
v.  
WARDEN K.J. WENDT,  
Respondent.

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)  
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)  
)

No. 3:04-CV-1544-K

**FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION  
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE**

This action was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b), as implemented by an Order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge follow:

**FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS**

**I. Factual background**

Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner is an inmate in the federal prison system. Respondent is Warden K.J. Wendt.

On August 30, 1991, Petitioner was convicted of various drug related offenses in the Southern District of Texas. He was sentenced to 292 months confinement. Petitioner filed a motion to vacate, correct, or set-aside his conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district court denied the motion on July 27, 1994. On November 10, 1998, the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

On July 12, 2004, Petitioner filed this petition. He challenges his sentence on the basis of the Supreme Court's decisions in *Blakely v. Washington*, \_\_\_ U.S. \_\_\_, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004), and *Apprendi v. New Jersey*, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000); *see also United States v. Booker*, \_\_\_ U.S. \_\_\_, 125 S.Ct. 738, 756 ("Any fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt."). Specifically, he alleges his sentence was unconstitutionally enhanced under the federal sentencing guidelines based on additional fact-finding by the trial court.

The Court now finds the petition should be dismissed.

## **II. Discussion**

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is typically used to challenge the manner in which a sentence is executed. *See Warren v. Miles*, 230 F.3d 688, 694 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000). Title 28 U.S.C. § 2255, on the other hand, is the primary means under which a federal prisoner may collaterally attack the legality of his conviction or sentence. *See Cox v. Warden, Fed. Detention Ctr.*, 911 F.2d 1111, 1113 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1990). Section 2241, however, may be used by a federal prisoner to challenge the legality of his or her conviction or sentence if he or she can satisfy the requirements of the § 2255 "savings clause." The savings clause states:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that *the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention*.

28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2001) (emphasis added).

The petitioner bears the burden of showing that the § 2255 remedy is inadequate or

ineffective. *Reyes-Requena v. United States*, 243 F.3d 893, 901 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001) (quoting *Pack v. Ysuff*, 218 F.3d 448, 452 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000)). The Fifth Circuit has stated, “§ 2241 is not a mere substitute for § 2255 and [ ] the inadequacy or inefficacy requirement is stringent.” *Reyes-Requena*, 243 F.3d at 901; *see also, Pack*, 218 F.3d at 453 (“[M]erely failing to succeed in a section 2255 motion does not establish the inadequacy or ineffectiveness of the section 2255 remedy.”).

The savings clause of § 2255 applies to a claim (I) that is based on a retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision which establishes that the petitioner may have been convicted of a nonexistent offense and (ii) that was foreclosed by circuit law at the time when the claim should have been raised in the petitioner’s trial, appeal, or first § 2255 motion. *See Reyes-Requena*, 243 F.3d at 904.

The Fifth Circuit makes clear that to fall under the savings clause, the decision that the petitioner is relying on “must be retroactively applicable on collateral review.” *Reyes-Requena*, 243 F.3d at 904 (citing *Wofford v. Scott*, 177 F.3d 1236, 1244 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999)). In this case, Petitioner relies on the Supreme Court’s decisions in *Apprendi* and *Blakely*. Petitioner’s claims however, do not entitle him to relief because *Apprendi* is not applicable on collateral review. *See United States v. Brown*, 305 F.3d 304, 305 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002). Further, the Supreme Court has not held that its decision in *Blakely* is to be made retroactive, and the opinion itself did not suggest that its holding would apply retroactively. *See generally Blakely*, \_\_\_\_ U.S. at \_\_\_, 124 S.Ct. at 2537-2541. Petitioner has failed to establish his petition falls under the savings clause. His petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 should be dismissed.

**RECOMMENDATION**


For the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends that Petitioner's habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 be dismissed with prejudice.

Signed this 18 day of February, 2005.

  
PAUL D. STICKNEY  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

**INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND  
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT**

The United States District Clerk shall serve a true copy of these findings, conclusions and recommendation on Plaintiff. Pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1), any party who desires to object to these findings, conclusions and recommendation must serve and file written objections within ten days after being served with a copy. A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings, conclusions or recommendation to which objections are being made. The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusory or general objections. A party's failure to file such written objections to these proposed findings, conclusions and recommendation shall bar that party from a *de novo* determination by the District Court. *See Thomas v. Arn*, 474 U.S. 140, 150, 106 S. Ct. 466, 472 (1985). Additionally, any failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendation within ten days after being served with a copy shall bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge that are accepted by the District Court, except upon grounds of plain error. *Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass'n*, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).



PAUL D. STICKNEY  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE